Swarthmore College

Works
Economics Faculty Works

Economics

2018

Isolating The Effect Of Injunctive Norms On Conservation
Behavior: New Evidence From A Field Experiment In California
Syon Bhanot
Swarthmore College, sbhanot1@swarthmore.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-economics
Part of the Economics Commons

Let us know how access to these works benefits you

Recommended Citation
Syon Bhanot. (2018). "Isolating The Effect Of Injunctive Norms On Conservation Behavior: New Evidence
From A Field Experiment In California". Organizational Behavior And Human Decision Processes. DOI:
10.1016/j.obhdp.2018.11.002
https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-economics/462

This work is brought to you for free by Swarthmore College Libraries' Works. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Economics Faculty Works by an authorized administrator of Works. For more information, please contact
myworks@swarthmore.edu.

1

Isolating the Effect of Injunctive Norms on Conservation Behavior:
New Evidence from a Field Experiment in California

Syon Bhanot

1

Swarthmore College
Forthcoming, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes

November 2018

1

My thanks to Will Holleran, Ora Chaiken, and the team at WaterSmart Software for making this

work possible. Thanks also to Chase Williamson, Sam Wang, Stephanie Kestelman, Rohit Nair, Nerissa
Nashin, Haksoo Lee, Tony Trinh, and (especially) Reed Orchinik for research assistance.

2

Abstract
Social norms messaging campaigns are increasingly used to influence human behavior,
with social science research generally finding that they have modest but meaningful
effects. One aspect of these campaigns in practice has been the inclusion of injunctive
norms messaging, designed to convey a social judgment about one’s behavior (often in
the form of encouraging or discouraging language, or a visual smiley or frowny face).
While some prominent research has provided support for the use of such messaging as a
tool for positive behavior change, causal evidence on the effect of injunctive norms
messaging as a motivator (as opposed to just one part of a multifaceted messaging
campaign) is limited. This paper presents a field experiment on water conservation
behavior conducted by an organization in California, involving over 40,000 households,
which provides some of the most precise evidence to date regarding the effect of
injunctive norms on decision making. I find that not only do injunctive norms
encourage conservation behavior, there is also no evidence that they discourage
individuals from further attending to norms messaging–regardless of whether the social
judgment conveyed is negative or positive. Taken together, this suggests that injunctive
norms are a useful tool in “nudge”-style campaigns tackling behavior change.

Keywords: Social Norms, Conservation, Injunctive Norms, Social Judgment, Field
Experiment, Behavioral Nudges
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Isolating the Effect of Injunctive Norms on Conservation Behavior:
New Evidence from a Field Experiment in California
1

Introduction

There is a rich literature in behavioral economics and social psychology on how
social norms can influence behavior. One growing area of research in this domain
involves using social norms to influence conservation decisions, with research finding
that providing households with information on the energy or water use of neighbors can
decrease resource consumption (Allcott, 2011; Brent, Cook, & Olsen, 2015; Ferraro &
Price, 2013). Important past work in this area has argued that injunctive norms
framing–messaging conveying a social judgment about behavior–is a key element of such
informational campaigns (Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2007).
This work is theoretically important also; by exploring the distinct behavioral impact of
injunctive norms, we gain insights regarding how and why social norms impact
behavior. That is, if people are influenced by injunctive norms, it implies that
individual perceptions regarding what others consider “good” and “bad” behavior are
an important part of why social norms are so influential in everyday life.
However, there is very little causal evidence regarding the distinct impact of
injunctive norms messaging on behavior, with most experimental work estimating the
effects of broader campaigns that incorporate injunctive norms as only one component.
Furthermore, as I will discuss, there are some shortcomings in existing research on the
effect of injunctive norms that make existing findings not definitive. In this paper, I
present experimental evidence from a natural field experiment that addresses many of
these shortcomings. Furthermore, the experiment I present allows me to explore the
impacts of injunctive norms messaging not only on conservation behavior, but also on
the desire for future social norms messages.
This paper builds on a large literature in social science on social norms and
interventions that leverage norms for behavior change. Researchers studying social
norms often emphasize the distinction between descriptive norms, which simply describe
the behavior of others, and injunctive norms, which convey social approval or
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disapproval of a given behavior (Cialdini et al., 2006; Jacobson, Mortensen, & Cialdini,
2011; Schultz et al., 2007). In a seminal paper, Schultz et al. (2007) presents the results
of a field experiment using door hangers to test the effects of using injunctive and
descriptive norms messaging to reduce energy use. The authors find that low energy
users increased their energy use when receiving descriptive norm information only (an
adverse “boomerang effect” from social norms information), but argue that this effect
for low users was eliminated by an additional injunctive norm message (a smiley or
frowny face that was hand drawn onto the door hanger). Furthermore, they find that
the inclusion of injunctive norms messaging also reduced energy consumption for high
users, above and beyond how much descriptive norms reduced use.
While Schultz et al. (2007) offers promising results in support of the independent
effect of injunctive norms on behavior, the study had some shortcomings that limit the
extent to which its findings can be treated as definitive. First, the injunctive norm
message in Schultz et al. (2007) came in the form of a hand-drawn visual, which was
absent from the “descriptive norm only” condition. It is possible that the visual cue,
independent of the social judgment it conveyed, might have influenced behavior by
drawing the reader’s eye to the door hanger in a way that the “descriptive-norm-only”
door hanger did not. Alternatively, the messaging may have worked because the
hand-drawn nature of the visual introduced the idea of being observed by an actual
person, which is a similar but not conceptually identical motivator to injunctive norms.
Second, the sample size in Schultz et al. (2007) was relatively small (290 households),
which makes independent conceptual replications with a more robust sample size an
important exercise (Aarts et al., 2015; Camerer et al., 2016; Maniadis, Tufano, & List,
2014). Third, their sample consisted only of households who knew they were being
studied, which might have influenced their decisions. Fourth, as with many other
studies in this domain, it was impossible to know who actually looked at the
informational door hanger, making it difficult to learn more about how the messaging
impacted those who were actually attentive to it.
Despite these limitations, Schultz et al. (2007) had significant impacts on both
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academic work and in applied settings, with a number of firms and organizations using
their findings to develop tools for behavior change in the resource conservation space. In
particular, firms like Opower and WaterSmart Software (the partner firm in this study)
developed and continue to use social information with injunctive messaging to influence
conservation behavior, with recent academic work finding that the messaging developed
by these firms has had meaningful effects on the conservation of energy (Allcott, 2011;
Allcott & Rogers, 2014) and water (Brent et al., 2015). However, when this research has
explored the impact of injunctive norms specifically, the results have been mixed. For
example, Allcott (2011) uses a regression discontinuity approach to estimate the impact
of the specific smiley faces used in Opower messaging, but fails to find evidence
supporting the impact of any one type of injunctive norm on energy use. However, the
evidence in Allcott (2011) on injunctive norms also has its limitations. For example,
while the regression discontinuity design provides a strong estimate, it is restricted in its
causal inference to individuals located around the thresholds. Furthermore, as with
most other papers in this literature, Allcott (2011) is unable to distinguish between
those who do versus do not actually see the social norms information (as the
information is sent in paper form through the mail). Taken together, the body of
existing evidence can be summarized as providing imperfect or mixed evidence
regarding the independent impact of injunctive norms messaging on behavior.
In this paper, I provide clear, causal evidence on the independent effect of
injunctive norms on conservation behavior. Specifically, I present the results from a
large-scale, randomized field experiment conducted by WaterSmart Software, a firm in
California that works with public utilities to reduce household water use. In the
experiment, the firm randomly assigned 45,866 households to one of four different
conditions2 : (1) a control group that received no social information; (2) a “No Drop”
treatment group that received social information without a visual cue; (3) a “Drop”
treatment group that received social information with a basic visual cue (a plain
2

In this paper, we only analyze the data for a large subset (41,365) of these households, for reasons

outlined in section 3.5.
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cartoon water droplet); and (4) an “Injunctive Drop” treatment group that received
exactly the same messaging as the “Drop” condition, but with an injunctive message
added into the visual cue (a smiley, neutral, or frowny face inside the water droplet,
depending on the water consumption of the household). Importantly, this experiment
took place without the households’ knowledge, and was delivered using tracked emails
(meaning that whether or not an email was opened was measured). The intervention
took place over multiple months, with subjects receiving up to seven emails each with
messaging that varied as their water use changed over time.
The nature of this experimental design allows for a variety of contributions to
existing literature. First and foremost, the design helps us isolate the causal impact of
injunctive norms on behavior (by comparing the Drop and Injunctive Drop conditions).
This is of theoretical importance because if injunctive norms messaging “works” here, it
suggests that social norms shape behavior, at least in part, because they transmit
information about what individuals “should” be doing. Furthermore, I provide evidence
not only on the treatment effects of injunctive norms on conservation behavior, but also
on individual-level willingness to obtain further social norms information (since I can
observe whether emails were opened or not). Second, because of the large sample size in
this experiment, I am able to provide evidence that is significantly more statistically
robust than previous work with smaller samples. Third, this study represents a “natural
field experiment,” meaning that subjects were unaware that they were being studied
using a randomized experiment (Harrison & List, 2004). This results in findings that
are highly generalizable to similar field contexts, where organizations seek to influence
real world behavior using injunctive norms messaging.
There are two key findings from the experiment. First, I find clear evidence that
the inclusion of an injunctive norm message does reduce water use, a positive and
independent effect from injunctive norms messaging that aligns with the findings in
Schultz et al. (2007). Notably, there is little evidence to suggest that this effect from
injunctive norms is much different for high versus low water users. Second, I find no
evidence that injunctive norms messaging discourages individuals from attending to
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future social norms messaging. That is, subjects receiving injunctive norms messaging
are not significantly less likely to open future email messages motivating them with
social norms (and injunctive) messages. Taken together these findings affirm the ability
of injunctive norms messaging to encourage conservation behavior in particular, and
support the use of such messaging in “nudge”-style campaigns moving forward.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background information on
social norms interventions and the effect of injunctive norms on behavior in particular,
and then outlines the hypotheses of the experiment. Section 3 outlines the experiment
itself. Section 4 offers a description of the empirical methods used for analyzing the
data and presents the results. Section 5 discusses the implications of the results and
concludes.

2
2.1

Background

Social Norms Messaging
A large and growing body of literature has explored the effects of social norms

information on human decision making in a variety of contexts, including savings
behavior (Beshears, Choi, Laibson, Madrian, & Milkman, 2015), restaurant orders (Cai,
Chen, & Fang, 2009), charitable giving (Frey & Meier, 2004; Krupka & Croson, 2016),
and voting behavior (Funk, 2010; Gerber, Green, & Larimer, 2008; Gerber & Rogers,
2009). Among the largest strands of literature in this domain studies interventions that
use social norms messaging to influence prosocial, environmentally-friendly behavior,
with a series of high-profile papers documenting the robust power of the social norms
approach (Allcott, 2011; Allcott & Rogers, 2014; Brent et al., 2015; Cialdini et al., 2006;
Ferraro & Price, 2013; Schultz et al., 2007).
The prior work that is most directly relevant for this paper is Schultz et al.
(2007), which presents the results of a field experiment designed to test the effects of
using injunctive and descriptive norms messaging to reduce energy use. In the study,
the authors randomly assigned 290 recruited households in California to one of two
conditions: (1) a “descriptive-norm-only” group receiving a door hanger with
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information about the household’s energy use and the energy use of the household’s
neighbors; and (2) a “descriptive-plus-injunctive-information” group, receiving the same
descriptive norm information but with an added hand-drawn “frowny” or “smiley” face
included (based on whether or not a household’s energy use was above or below the
average consumption of other homes in their neighborhood). The authors find that low
energy users increased their energy use when receiving descriptive norm information
only, but find that this effect for low users was eliminated when injunctive norm
messaging was added. Furthermore, they find that the inclusion of injunctive norms
messaging was also effective for high energy users, as adding an injunctive message
resulted in slightly larger decreases in energy use by these users than was achieved by
descriptive norms only.
In the decade since the publication of Schultz et al. (2007), private firms like
Opower and WaterSmart Software have built large-scale social norm messaging
campaigns (incorporating both injunctive and descriptive norms) to encourage
conservation. Academic work has explored the causal impact of such efforts,
consistently finding that social norms messaging campaigns result in greater reductions
in resource consumption (Allcott, 2011; Brent et al., 2015; Ferraro & Price, 2013). In
Allcott (2011), for example, the author reports on a series of randomized control trials
conducted by Opower, using social norms messaging to influence energy use. Using data
from 17 separate Opower projects, the author estimates the causal impact of social
norms messaging at roughly 2%, and further finds that the decreases in energy use are
especially pronounced for previously high users of energy. Ferraro and Price (2013) find
similar results from an experiment conducted in Cobb County, Georgia, estimating that
social norms messaging in a paper mailer campaign reduced water use by 2-5%,
depending on the “strength” of the social norm language. As in Allcott (2011), the
authors also find that the largest effects come from those with the highest ex-ante water
use. Finally, Brent et al. (2015) reports on three separate experiments conducted by
WaterSmart Software on the efficacy of similar social norms messaging campaigns,
finding treatment effects that range from 1-5% reductions in water use. Taken together,
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these papers offer evidence that social norms messaging campaigns that use both
descriptive and injunctive norms are effective at reducing resource use on the aggregate.

2.2

Injunctive Norms
Most of the existing work on social norms messaging, discussed above, focused

primarily on the average treatment effects of the campaigns overall. However, less
emphasis was placed on which aspect of the social norms messaging–descriptive or
injunctive–was most responsible for the behavior change. Conceptually, there is an
important distinction between a descriptive social norm, which simply describes the
behavior of others, and an injunctive social norm, which conveys social approval or
disapproval of a given behavior (Cialdini et al., 2006; Jacobson et al., 2011; Schultz et
al., 2007). That is, a descriptive social norm simply tells you what other individuals are
doing, whereas an injunctive social norm conveys what others think you should be
doing. Much of the research on social norms in the domain of conservation behavior has
studied social norms messaging campaigns that used both descriptive and injunctive
norms simultaneously. Clearly, it is challenging to use such a setup to disentangle the
impact of injunctive norms from descriptive ones. In practice this is an important
distinction to make–if we are to build effective behavior change campaigns using social
norms, we should know if and how injunctive norm messaging supplements or detracts
from descriptive norm information.
Overall, evidence regarding the independent impact of injunctive norms on
behavior from past research is mixed. One result comes from Cialdini et al. (2006), who
ran an experiment at the Petrified Forest National Park in Arizona exploring how
messages on park signs influence the likelihood of petrified wood theft. In the study, the
authors varied both the general framing of wording on signs (negative framing versus
positive framing), and the nature of the norms message (injunctive versus descriptive
norms language). The visuals on the signs also varied across the experimental
conditions. The authors find that the most efficacious messaging was negatively-worded
injunctive messaging (“Please don’t remove the petrified wood from the park”), but
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conclude that “norm-based persuasive communications are likely to have their best
effects when communicators align descriptive and injunctive normative messages to work
in tandem rather than in competition with one another.” (Cialdini et al., 2006, p.13)
While Cialdini et al. (2006) does provide evidence regarding the differential
impacts of descriptive and injunctive norms, the experimental conditions were not
ideally suited to make that distinction, for at least two reasons. First, the fact that the
norms conditions manifested in the form of different written messages on the signs
makes it hard to prove that the authors’ text manipulation was only changing the
messaging on the injunctive versus descriptive spectrum.3 Furthermore, since there was
no real control group in their design (treatments were compared to each other),
injunctive norms messaging is not (and cannot be) compared directly to an absence of
such messaging in their study. Second, the authors varied the visuals on the signs as
well, as part of the treatment, which compounds the issue of identifying what exactly
drove differences in behavior across conditions. Thus, it is hard to use Cialdini et al.
(2006) to make definitive conclusions about the efficacy of injunctive versus descriptive
norms.
Of course, Schultz et al. (2007) also provided important evidence on the impact of
injunctive norms on behavior, through the use of an experimental condition that added
an injunctive norm message (the smiley/frowny face) to a descriptive norm message,
which was used alone in a different condition. However, as discussed earlier, their
evidence has limitations that influence the extent to which it can be treated as
definitive. First, the authors cannot rule out the possibility that the visual cue itself
(and not the injunctive norms message it contained) may have caused the behavior
change by drawing attention to the door hanger the authors used. Furthermore, the fact
that the visual was hand-drawn may have communicated to households that they were
being watched by actual people (which is distinct conceptually from injunctive norms as
a motivator of behavior change). Second, the study’s relatively small sample (290) of
3

While the authors attempt to justify how individuals interpret norms using a survey with social

psychology students, these measures may be affected by the students’ knowledge about the intended
effects of these norms from their coursework.
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households who participated in the experiment knowingly limits the study’s
generalizability and necessitates replication. Taken together, these limitations suggest
that further evidence is needed to better understand if and how injunctive norms
contribute to behavior change in the context of large-scale, automated messaging
campaigns.
Allcott (2011) also seeks to provide evidence regarding the causal impact of
injunctive norms, by investigating experimental data on social norms messaging
interventions to reduce energy use by Opower. Specifically, the author uses the fact that
Opower varied the injunctive norm message they included on messaging using an
algorithm with cutoffs. This allows the author to use a regression-discontinuity
approach to estimate the causal impact of specific injunctive norms (by looking at
individuals on either side of a given cutoff for a positive versus neutral versus negative
injunctive norm message). The author finds no evidence that the nature of the
injunctive norm messaging influences energy use, in contrast to the findings of Schultz
et al. (2007). However, while the regression-discontinuity approach allows for a
relatively compelling causal estimate in this case (with a large sample size), causal
inference in the regression-discontinuity approach is limited to individuals located near
the thresholds. Therefore, given the conflicting results on injunctive norms messaging in
Allcott (2011) relative to previous findings, more evidence is needed in this domain.
Furthermore, as the discussion so far suggests, most work on injunctive norms in
the literature on social norms interventions looks at a narrow form of behavior–namely
the response on the specific behavior the norms messaging is about (energy or water
use, in the conservation space). However, it is plausible that injunctive messaging might
influence behavior or attitudes in other ways as well. For example, it is possible that
the recipient of the injunctive norm message may react to scrutiny or social judgment
by avoiding future “judgmental” information (Golman, Hagmann, & Loewenstein,
2017). In the context of digital messaging campaigns with many emails, this could
mean individuals not opening emails they know will contain injunctive norms content,
to avoid information about how others are judging them. This can be thought of as an
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“ostrich effect” response to injunctive norms, whereby people “stick their head in the
sand” via information avoidance when they suspect future information will reflect
negatively on them (Eil & Rao, 2011; Karlsson, Loewenstein, & Seppi, 2009; Sicherman,
Loewenstein, Seppi, & Utkus, 2016). Alternatively, some evidence suggests that
injunctive norms may trigger self-reflection and effortful self-regulation, which could
actually increase engagement with future social norms messaging (Jacobson et al.,
2011). This is loosely related to what Gherzi, Egan, Stewart, Haisley, and Ayton (2014)
refer to as the “meerkat effect,” whereby the receipt of information may actually
heighten vigilance and attentiveness to further information. Whereas previous studies in
this literature have been unable to look into these possible reactions to injunctive norms
messaging (since engagement with norms messaging was not observable at the
individual level), I am able to offer evidence on this question by exploring whether or
not subjects opened the social norms email messages they received.

2.3

Hypotheses
This paper posits two primary hypotheses regarding the impact of injunctive

norms on conservation behavior. First, motivated by the findings in Schultz et al.
(2007), I hypothesize that injunctive norms messaging, when added to descriptive
norms messaging, leads to larger reductions in water use than descriptive norms
messaging alone accomplishes. Second, I hypothesize that individuals do not have a
strong aversion to injunctive norms messages, in the sense that receipt of injunctive
norms messaging will not lower an individual’s attentiveness to further norms messages.
Admittedly, this second hypothesis relates to a question about which there is little
existing evidence, and about which there are conflicting conceptual ideas (as outlined in
section 2.2). A plausible alternative hypothesis would be that injunctive norms do
influence attentiveness to future messaging, and that this might vary depending on the
nature of that messaging. For example, it is plausible that a good social judgment (a
smiley face) might trigger a different response, in terms of attentiveness to further
messaging, than a bad social judgment (a frowny face). Given the relative shortage of
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evidence, therefore, I explore this as a somewhat open question and offer some of the
first causal evidence on it.

3
3.1

Experiment Overview

Partners
This experiment was implemented by WaterSmart Software, a California-based

firm that works directly with utilities to promote behavior change in water use.
WaterSmart’s primary means of communication with households is via personalized
emails containing Home Water Reports (HWRs), which contain social information on
water use and recommendations about efficient household fixture upgrades. Through
data sharing agreements with their utility partners, WaterSmart tracks water use and
customer engagement over time. For this experiment, WaterSmart partnered with a
public utility partner that serves various cities and towns in the greater San Francisco
Bay Area.

3.2

Sample
The initial sample selected for inclusion in this experiment was 45,866

single-family homes from 28 different cities and towns in the greater San Francisco Bay
Area. Residents of these homes all received water through the public utility partner.
Each household in this study was associated with a single, unique water meter, which
provided the water use data for this experiment, and a single email address, which
received the HWR emails if the household was assigned to a treatment group.4
Therefore, there is no complication from multiple housing units sharing a single water
meter. WaterSmart intended to send a maximum of either six or seven emails to each
household in the sample (depending on the exact date of their meter reads).
The five towns that supplied the largest number of subjects to the sample were
Oakland, Richmond, San Leandro, Berkeley, and San Ramon. Prior to the start of this
4

Because each household was associated with one subject and their email address, I use “subjects”

and “households” somewhat interchangeably in the paper.
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experiment, WaterSmart was already sending HWRs to other households in this region
through their partnership with the public utility. However, this study targeted
households who were being added to the existing base of customers receiving HWRs, so
all households in this study were receiving HWR emails for the first time.
3.3

Study Design
All 45,866 households described were randomly assigned to one of four conditions:

Control; No Drop; Drop; and Injunctive Drop. The Control group (10% of the sample)
received no emails. The No Drop group (40% of the sample) received standard HWR
emails, with peer information and other messaging, but no visual cue or injunctive
norms messaging. The Drop group (40% of the sample) received the same HWR emails
as the No Drop group, but with an additional visual cue at the top of the email (a
water droplet). Finally, the Injunctive Drop group (10% of the sample) received the
same HWR emails as the Drop group, but with the addition of an injunctive norm
message inside the water droplet visual. Specifically, in the Injunctive Drop condition
the droplet visual contained a smiley, neutral or frowny face (visible in Figure 2) to
represent the household’s water use performance relative to similar homes. The precise
injunctive visual used in each HWR email in this condition was determined internally
by WaterSmart, using an algorithm that took household demographic characteristics
into account (to determine household water consumption relative to need). The Drop
and No Drop groups were larger in size than the Control and Injunctive Drop
conditions because of internal priorities at WaterSmart. An example of the visual
differences between the treatments is provided in Figure 1. Note that the content below
the drop visual (or absence of it) is the same across treatments, though both the text
and the bar graph visuals naturally varied across households and over time (but in a
manner that was unrelated to the treatment assignments in this experiment).
3.4

Demographics, Randomization, and Balance Check
Randomization was done by WaterSmart, using a simple randomization for the

45,866 households in the sample. The firm has a track record of experimentation and
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conducting randomized evaluations with academic partners (Bhanot, 2017; Brent et al.,
2015). Table 1 shows the mean values for various observable characteristics by
condition, and overall, for the full sample of 45,866 households. To test the balance of
the sample on the observed demographic characteristics, I run a set of regressions of
each treatment condition on the various demographic characteristics, excluding data
from all other conditions except the control. This allows for a set of pairwise balance
checks for each treatment condition against the control. I then use F -tests to test for
joint significance and balance. Table 2 shows the results of these analyses. In addition,
Table 2 shows the results of a similar test for balance between the treatment conditions
only, excluding all control observations; this is added because the key specifications in
this paper involve comparisons between treatments.
When comparing each condition to the control in columns 1-3 in Table 2, we see
signs of small but statistically significant imbalances in demographic characteristics
between each individual treatment and the control, apparently stemming from the
control group in particular. These differences seemingly occurred by chance, but
necessitate the use of demographic controls in the analysis, particularly for analysis
using the control group. Importantly however, there does not appear to be any
imbalance between the households assigned to the three treatment conditions, as visible
in columns 4-5 of Table 2. This is important, since between-treatment differences are
the centerpiece of this paper’s analysis.
The experiment proceeded based on this randomization, and a few details of
implementation are worth emphasizing. First, to determine the nature of the
information included in the HWR emails, WaterSmart used an internal algorithm to
classify households based on water use need (using occupancy and lot size, among other
variables). This classification was then used as the basis of comparison to populate the
HWRs’ social information content (including the nature of the injunctive norm for
those in the Injunctive Drop condition, as mentioned earlier). Second, of the 41,280
subjects assigned to one of the three treatment groups from the full sample, most
(34,327, or 83.16%) received six or seven experimental HWR emails as planned. Online
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Appendix Table A.1 outlines the number of subjects in each treatment group, and the
distribution of the number of emails received by subjects in each group. Third, because
water use is highly seasonal (higher in the summer than in the winter), I use
month-in-sample fixed effects to control for trends in water use across the sample over
time. Furthermore, I control for each household’s water use in the matching calendar
month pre-experiment when analyzing post-experiment observations (as described in
section 4), to control for any household-specific trends in water use by calendar month,
which recur from year to year.
3.5

Data Restrictions
The dataset including the full 45,866 households had to be trimmed prior to

analysis, which impacts how the results should be viewed. There were two sets of data
restrictions — one set that involved removing data across conditions (treatments and
control) and one set that involved removing data from treatment households only.
Importantly, the first set of restrictions should not differentially impact the control and
treatment conditions in terms of balance, but the second set may cause some
imbalances. This ultimately means that we should not infer too much from the specific
estimates from the analysis involving the control group, because of selection issues
(especially in light of the imbalances found in the randomization check in section 3.4).
However, this is not critical to the central findings of the paper, which relate to how the
treatments compare to one another. In this section I will outline these two sets of data
restrictions.
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The first set of data restrictions applied to households across conditions. First, I
removed 67 households that had at least one reading of over 5,000 gallons per day of
water use in the period analyzed in the data (December 2013 onward). This was based
on advice from WaterSmart, who identified these homes as outliers who likely had a
major water leak in their high water use period or periods. Second, I focused my
analysis on only the subset of remaining households that had a water meter read
between November 17, 2014 and January 21, 2015. To understand the reason for this,
note that while the experiment began in late 2014 and carried on through the latter half
of 2015, households assigned to the treatment conditions began receiving HWRs at
different times for a variety of scheduling and logistical reasons. In other words, there
was no clear and universal “start date” for the experiment. This complicates analysis
that involves the control group, because it is not immediately obvious when control
households “would have” received their first mailer had they been treated. However, for
households who got a water meter read in the window of dates noted above, I can
directly link their water meter read dates with the dates they received (or “would have
received,” for the Control group) their first HWR (between December 9, 2014 and
January 30, 2015). The exact process I used to do this is described in the Online
Appendix. This process removed 706 households from the analysis, across conditions,
leaving 45,093 households from the original sample.
A second set of data restrictions was then applied to these 45,093 households, and
was specific to households in the three treatment groups only. First, 396 treatment
households were dropped because they never received an HWR email; this occurred
because of logistical issues (families moving before the experiment began, issues with
email addresses, etc). Next, I removed 1,865 treatment households that did not receive
their first HWR in the window of time I focused on in this study (December 9, 2014 to
January 30, 2015). That is, some individuals in the sample received their first HWR
much earlier in 2014 or much later in 2015. Finally, 1,467 treatment households were
removed because of misalignments between the water use measured in their meter reads
and the water use feedback provided in their subsequent HWR. In other words, for these
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households, the number of gallons per day from their last water meter read was not
reflected in their next HWR at least once, because of timing issues related to exactly
when their reads were done and when the emails went out. In all of these instances,
water use rates from an earlier read were used in HWRs, but because of this asymmetry
in reads and HWR content, I exclude these anomalous households from analysis.
After these trims of the dataset, 41,365 households remained from the initial
45,866, and these households comprise the sample that I empirically investigate here.
Importantly, the second set of data restriction processes described above involved
removing only households from the treatment groups because of anomalies related to the
content or delivery of HWRs specifically. Though there is no strong ex-ante reason to
believe that this would cause major imbalances between Control households and those
in the treatment conditions, these adjustments may influence the analysis involving
comparisons between the Control and the treatment conditions. However, it would not
affect comparisons across treatments, which is the primary focus of this paper.
4

Empirical Methods and Results

In this section, I outline the empirical approaches used to analyze the experimental
data, and present the results. Because I address various questions in this paper, I
present these methods and findings by research question in the subsections below.
4.1

What is the unique effect of injunctive norms messaging on water use
behavior?
The central question in this paper is whether and how injunctive norms affect

prosocial behavior, in this case water consumption. To estimate this, we must exploit
the differences between the treatments, rather than their differences relative to a control
group that did not receive emails at all. In particular, recall that the No Drop condition
provides only social information, the Drop condition adds an additional visual cue to
the No Drop condition, and the Injunctive Drop condition provides an injunctive norm
message within the visual cue. Therefore by comparing these conditions we can isolate
both the causal impact of including a visual cue on water use (by comparing the No
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Drop and Drop treatments) and, most importantly, the causal impact of injunctive
norms messaging on water use (by comparing the Drop and Injunctive Drop
treatments).
The general specification I use to estimate these causal impacts is as follows.
First, I restrict my analysis to only post-treatment observations for each household, and
regress water use for all post-treatment observations (measured in gallons per day) on
dummy variables for assignment to each experimental condition (omitting one
condition). These dummy variables for a regression involving n+1 conditions are
captured by the

Pn

1 [βn (Tn )i ]

term below. I then add controls for the following: 1) the

water use for a given household in the matching calendar month pre-treatment (drawn
from December 2013 to November 2014 water use data and denoted GPDpreim below);
2) various demographic characteristics at the household level (number of occupants,
home size, number of floors, lot size, irrigable area, number of bedrooms, and number of
bathrooms), denoted λi below; 3) wave fixed effects (denoted γw below); and 4)
month-in-sample fixed effects (effectively a set of dummy variables for the month and
year combination for a given meter read observation, to control for general water use
trends over time in the sample), denoted δm below. This empirical approach generally
follows that used by List, Metcalfe, Price, and Rundhammer (2017) and Allcott and
Rogers (2014), who perform similar analyses on similar data. The full specification with
all controls is given below:
GPDimw = β0 +

n
X

[βn (Tn )i ] +GPDpreim + λi + γw + δm + 

1

Returning to the central research question, to isolate the causal impact of the
injunctive norms messaging I run the specification above excluding data from the
control group, thereby comparing the treatments directly to one another. The results
are reported in columns 1-3 in Table 3.5 In the preferred specification in column 3, the
effect of the Injunctive Drop condition is significantly larger than that of the No Drop
5

Note that all analyses in Table 3 were also conducted without the data restrictions outlined in section

3.5. These results are qualitatively similar to those in Table 3, and are visible in Online Appendix Table
A.3.
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condition, which is omitted from the regression (an effect size of 2.5 gallons per day,
which is significant at a 1% level). Furthermore, the p-values from Wald tests
comparing the regression coefficients for the Injunctive Drop condition and the Drop
condition (thereby directly testing the effect of the injunctive norm messaging) are
consistently significant at the 5% or 10% level across specifications. This is the critical
empirical result, as it implies that the reason the Injunctive Drop condition performs
best has to do with the social judgment in the visual, rather than the visual cue of the
droplet alone (indeed, the coefficient on “Drop” is not significant here).
These results suggest that the inclusion of injunctive messaging is a crucial
component of the efficacy of this social information campaign. Indeed, unlike previous
work in this domain, this study provides causal evidence on the role of injunctive
messaging specifically, as the only difference between the Injunctive Drop and Drop
conditions was the inclusion of the smiley/neutral/frowny face in the drop visual
included in both conditions.
The analysis in Table 3 focuses on the average treatment effects of each condition,
but it is also plausible that the injunctive norm messaging might influence behavior
differently for those using less versus more water (as this would shape whether they see
regular social approval or disapproval in the injunctive messaging campaign). I explore
this question by computing disaggregated average treatment effects of the injunctive
norm messaging (by comparing water use in the Injunctive Drop and Drop treatment
groups), by decile of pre-experiment water use.6 The pre-experiment water use measure
I use is the mean water use for a given household from December 2013 to November
2014, and deciles were constructed for this variable within each of five possible
categorical “buckets” for the number of occupants in a household (1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 or
more persons). This allows me to control somewhat for differential water use needs by
family size. The regression specification I use is precisely the same as that used in
column 3 in Table 3 (with all controls), however I restrict analysis to only the Drop and
6

The use of deciles is admittedly somewhat arbitrary, but I argue it is reasonable given the sample

size and the use of deciles in similar analysis in related past work (including Allcott (2011)).

21

Injunctive Drop treatment groups here, and use the Drop treatment group as the
omitted group in the regression. This means that the coefficients on the Injunctive
Drop dummy variable in the regressions correspond to the average treatment effect
estimates of the injunctive norm messaging on water use for each of the ten deciles of
pre-experiment water use.
The results of this analysis are displayed in Figure 3, which shows the average
treatment effect estimates drawn from the ten regression coefficients in this analysis,
along with the corresponding standard errors. Because the use of deciles “splits” the
data into many subgroups, it is important not to over-infer based on these estimates;
instead, they should be viewed as providing clues regarding how the intensity of prior
water use correlates with response to injunctive norms. The results suggest that those
who use very little water ex-ante seem to respond to injunctive norms messaging by
slightly lowering their use (see deciles 1-3), as do those with relatively high (but not
extremely high) water usage (deciles 8-9). The results are mixed for those in the middle
of the distribution (deciles 4-7). Interestingly, those who use the most water ex-ante
(decile 10) seem to display an adverse reaction to injunctive norms messaging, as
captured by the significant increase in water use for decile 10 households in the
Injunctive Drop treatment relative to those in the Drop treatment. Note that whereas
Schultz et al. (2007) only disaggregate their analysis using a median split of the data,
the larger dataset here allows for more detailed analysis–and an interesting pattern
emerges. As with Schultz et al. (2007), I find that the injunctive norms messaging
seems to be having a positive impact on low water users, but I also find suggestive
evidence that the story is not all rosy at the upper end of the water use distribution. In
particular, injunctive norms may be backfiring here for the highest water users in the
population, causing them to use more water than they would have if they had simply
seen a drop visual without the added social judgment.
Overall, the results presented here provide evidence that, on average, the inclusion
of injunctive norms in resource conservation messaging campaigns using social norms
has a beneficial impact on the efficacy of these campaigns. However, the disaggregated
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analysis using pre-experiment water use suggests some heterogeneity in response to
injunctive norms messaging. However, given the fine slicing of the data here, more
research is needed before definitive conclusions can be reached regarding the effects of
injunctive norms on different subgroups.

4.2

How much of the overall treatment effect of the mailers comes from
injunctive norms?
To benchmark the average treatment effect sizes for injunctive norms messaging

observed in section 4.1, I also conducted analysis including the control group that did
not receive HWRs. Doing so allows me to estimate the magnitude of the causal effect of
the injunctive norms messaging in isolation, as a percentage of the “total” effect of all
aspects of the HWR with the most content (namely the Injunctive Drop HWR email,
which had descriptive norms content, tips about water conservation, injunctive norms
messaging, a visual cue, etc). Note that this analysis also serves to replicate previous
findings on the average treatment effects of social information campaigns for
conservation (Allcott, 2011; Brent et al., 2015; Ferraro & Price, 2013). This is
important for two reasons. First, past studies have explored paper mailers and not
email messaging campaigns, so the average treatment effects estimated in this paper
add to a relatively small literature regarding the effectiveness of digital campaigns for
behavior change. Second, a great deal of recent research has emphasized the critical
importance of independent replications in their own right (Aarts et al., 2015; Camerer
et al., 2016; Maniadis et al., 2014).
Columns 4-6 in Table 3 display the average treatment effect estimates for each
treatment group, relative to the control group, using the same three regression
specifications as used in columns 1-3. In all specifications, there is a statistically
significant treatment effect on the amount of water used for all treatment conditions,
with all conditions reducing water use relative to the control. In the preferred
specification in column 6, with a full set of controls and fixed effects, the effect estimates
range from 5.7-8.3 gallons per day (roughly 3-5% of mean use). These effect sizes are
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consistent with those in previous work (Allcott, 2011; Brent et al., 2015; Ferraro &
Price, 2013), and show that social information provision was effective in encouraging
conservation behavior in this context. Note that the precision of these estimates should
be treated with caution, given the demographic imbalances in the control group
specifically (see section 3.4) and the data restriction processes (see section 3.5).
Nevertheless, these estimates provide a benchmark for evaluating the relative
importance of injunctive norms messaging. Specifically, if we take the point estimates in
Table 3 at face value, we obtain a rough estimate of the proportion of the efficacy of the
Injunctive Drop HWR emails that can be attributed to each aspect of the messaging
that the Injunctive Drop HWR emails contained (the general social information and
other HWR content, the visual cue, and the injunctive norm message). Specifically,
assuming an average treatment effect of 8.256 gallons per day (column 6), the results
suggest that the injunctive norm messaging is responsible for roughly 21% of the overall
treatment effect ((8.256-6.525)/8.256), the visual cue for roughly 10%
((6.525-5.735)/8.256), and the rest of the social information and HWR content for the
remaining 69% (5.735/8.256).

4.3

Is there evidence that injunctive norms messaging discourages subjects
from attending to future social norms messaging?
One potential side effect of injunctive norms messaging is that it may influence

subjects’ likelihood of attending to future social norms messaging. As discussed in
section 2.2, the predicted effect here could go either way. For example, being told that
your behavior is met by social disapproval may discourage you from learning about
others’ attitudes about your behavior in the future (an “ostrich effect”), or it may
trigger effortful self-regulation or a “meerkat” effect (Gherzi et al., 2014; Jacobson et
al., 2011; Karlsson et al., 2009). The same ambiguity exists for individuals who see that
their behavior is socially approved–that is, these individuals may not see a need to pay
attention to future injunctive messaging because their behavior has already been
“approved of” by society, or it may heighten their desire for further social approval.
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To investigate this question, I use multiple empirical approaches. First, I focus on
the treatment groups only, and restrict my attention to the emailed HWR that
immediately followed the first emailed HWR that a given subject actually opened. Note
that the first email a given subject opened is not necessarily the first email a given
subject received–it is possible that they did not open the first email they received from
WaterSmart. But because I can see in the data whether or not a given email was
opened, I know which email was the first one that was actually opened, meaning I know
when a person first saw the injunctive norm messaging (or not, for those conditions
without an injunctive norms message).7 Then, by using whether or not subjects opened
the email immediately following their first visual engagement with an HWR email as an
outcome variable (the dummy variable EmailOpenedimw below), I can test for the effect
of the email’s content on the desire to engage with further social norms information.
The regression specification I run to conduct this analysis is as follows:
EmailOpenedimw = β0 + β1 (TDrop )i + β2 (TInjunctiveDrop )i + λi + γw + δm + 
Note that I add controls for: 1) various demographic characteristics at the household
level (number of occupants, home size, number of floors, lot size, irrigable area, number
of bedrooms, and number of bathrooms), denoted λi ; 2) wave fixed effects (denoted γw );
and 3) month-in-sample fixed effects, denoted δm . The results of this analysis are visible
in Table 4.
These results provide compelling evidence that both the visual cue and, more
importantly, the injunctive norms messaging have, on average, little to no effect on the
likelihood that a subject opens the HWR email that follows the first HWR email they
open. In particular, as shown in column 1 in Table 4, 65.7% of subjects in the No Drop
condition open the HWR email immediately following the first one they open, and
neither the Drop condition nor the Injunctive Drop condition significantly reduce that
figure. It is worth noting that the negative coefficient on the Injunctive Drop condition
is, in the regression without controls, significant at the 10% level, but the magnitude of
7

Critically, there was no way for subjects to see the content of an email (and thus the treatment)

without opening it, so I would not expect any selection into email opening by condition.

25

the coefficient decreases with controls and is no longer distinguishable from zero. When
restricting this analysis to the Drop and Injunctive Drop conditions only (in columns 3
and 4), to isolate the average effect of injunctive norms messaging in particular on the
likelihood of opening the next email, I again find no evidence of injunctive norms
significantly changing individual willingness to engage with future content. These
results suggest that injunctive norms do not result in significantly more or less attention
being paid to future messaging, at least as measured by subjects’ willingness to engage
with the next piece of messaging they are sent.
The analyses in Table 4 focused on the average effects of injunctive norms across
the sample, however. To explore the impact of the specific injunctive messaging types
used here (smiley vs. neutral vs. frowny face), I exploit the fact that I not only know
when an individual actually opened an email for the first time, but I also know what
content they observed when they opened that email. In particular, I am able to restrict
attention to only those subjects who, when they first opened an email, saw a
frowny/neutral/smiley face in the Injunctive Drop treatment and those in the Drop
treatment who “would have seen” a frowny/neutral/smiley face (had they been assigned
to the Injunctive Drop condition). By directly comparing those in the Injunctive Drop
and Drop conditions who saw/would have seen a smiley face when they first opened an
email, I am able to obtain a causal estimate of the effect of a positive injunctive norm
message (conveying social approval) on future engagement with HWR emails (again
using their likelihood of opening their next email). The regression specification I use
here is identical to that used in Table 4, column 4. I then repeat this analysis for the
neutral and frowny faces, to estimate the treatment effects of each injunctive message
type.
The results of this analysis are visible in Figure 4, which plots the average
treatment effects of each injunctive message type on the likelihood that subjects opened
the next HWR email. This figure provides limited evidence that the specific injunctive
norm messages have an impact on the likelihood of subjects to open ensuing mailers. If
anything, there is some evidence that the inclusion of the smiley face visual for low

26

water users encourages a slight decrease in the probability of opening the next email,
but the coefficient in the regression is not quite significant at the 10% level (p = 0.103).
Meanwhile, the coefficient for the frowny face injunctive message is positive but
indistinguishable from zero (p = 0.536), which is strong evidence against the existence of
any “ostrich effect” from including an injunctive message of social disapproval for high
water users. That is, adding a frowny face to the HWR for high water users did not
encourage these subjects to shy away from opening the next HWR email they received.
I next repeat similar analysis to that done above (in Table 4 and Figure 4), but
instead of using the opening of the HWR email immediately following the first opened
HWR email as the outcome measure, I instead use the percentage of emails a given
subject opened (from amongst those received) after they first opened an HWR email.
This serves as another test of how the injunctive norm messaging in the first opened
HWR email influences ensuing behavior.
I begin with a regression analysis that mirrors that used for the analysis in Table
4, but with this different outcome variable. The results, visible in Table 5, suggest that
there is no relationship between the inclusion of injunctive norms messaging and the
percentage of HWR emails opened by subjects, with all coefficients on treatment
variables being both very small in magnitude and not statistically significant. This is
consistent with the findings in Table 4, and supports the conclusion that the injunctive
norms messaging is not changing the individual-level likelihood of engaging with HWR
emails.
Finally, I replicate the process used to generate Figure 4, but again using the new
outcome variable, to determine the effect of the specific injunctive message seen in the
first HWR email opened on the percentage of future social norms email messages
opened. The average treatment effects are depicted in Figure 5. These results also
support the conclusion that the specific injunctive norms messages seen on the first
opened HWR (a smiley, neutral, or frowny face) did not have an impact on the
percentage of ensuing HWR emails that a given subject opened. Again, this is consistent
with a conclusion that while the injunctive norms messaging may have influenced water
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use behavior, observing the social judgment in the injunctive norms message did not
have an effect on the willingness of subjects to open the HWR emails that followed.

5

Discussion and Conclusions

In this paper, I provide the most statistically-robust evidence to date regarding
the impact of injunctive norms messaging on decision making in the context of social
norms messaging campaigns (which are increasingly used by organizations to change
human behavior). Specifically, the large-scale field experiment that I report on used
treatment conditions that allow me to isolate the effect of injunctive norms messaging
specifically. There are two primary findings from my analysis. First, I find compelling
evidence that the inclusion of injunctive norms messages that convey a social judgment
has, on average, a beneficial impact, leading to reductions in water use that are larger
than those from an email campaign omitting such messages. Second, I find no evidence
that the inclusion of injunctive norms messaging changes the likelihood that subjects
engage with future social norms messaging emails (as measured by the opening of these
emails). Furthermore, I find very little evidence that the specific types of injunctive
norms messages used (smiley, neutral, or frowny faces) influence how willing subjects
are to open future messages. If anything, there is weak evidence that positive social
judgments encourage high achievers to ignore future messaging (see Figures 4 and 5),
but these findings were not statistically significant.
There are important theoretical and conceptual implications of this work. First,
these findings suggest that a non-trivial part of the effectiveness of social norms
messaging campaigns is the social judgment that is conveyed by these efforts.
Researchers studying social norms have long emphasized the importance of collective
perceptions of what others “ought to do” as playing a key role in establishing norms
(Bicchieri & Chavez, 2010). The results in this paper support that interpretation, as
they suggest that the impact of norms messaging is reinforced when the messaging
comes with a clear social judgment about behavior.
Second, these results also offer important evidence regarding how messaging
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containing social judgments influence people’s willingness to engage with information.
In light of the ongoing “information revolution” for both individuals and organizations,
researchers in the behavioral sciences have become increasingly interested in the
demand for information at both the individual and organizational levels (Ganguly &
Tasoff, 2016; Gherzi et al., 2014; Golman et al., 2017; Golman & Loewenstein, 2016;
Karlsson et al., 2009). The results presented here suggest that when people receive
information about their behavior along with social judgments, their demand for further
information is not significantly affected by the inclusion of a social judgment. In some
sense, this is not surprising–as past research has suggested, information (both useful and
useless) can contribute to individual utility in both positive and negative ways (Eliaz &
Schotter, 2007; Golman et al., 2017). However, there is little real world evidence on the
demand for information from social norms campaigns, which are increasingly used by
organizations like WaterSmart to shape behavior on a large scale. By providing causal
evidence on this question, this paper makes a contribution to this burgeoning literature.
Finally, the practical takeaway for organizations and individuals looking to shape
behavior is simple. Based on the findings here, using injunctive norms messaging to
change behavior appears to be an effective tool for behavior change. And in particular,
while further research is required to better understand whether or not this is true in
other domains, the results in this paper suggest that injunctive norms should be used
with confidence by organizations seeking to influence resource conservation behavior
specifically.
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Table 1
Demographics by Experimental Condition
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Control No Drop Drop Injunctive Drop
Number of occupants

3.158
(1.100)
Home size (sqft.)
1837.1
(794.6)
Number of floors
1.416
(0.511)
Lot size (sqft.)
8127.9
(7316.4)
Irrigable area
4430.4
(4407.2)
Number of bedrooms
3.265
(0.973)
Number of bathrooms
2.221
(0.980)
Pretreatment Mean Water Use 260.4
(170.2)

N

4586

(5)
All

3.276
(1.230)
1822.4
(789.5)
1.405
(0.512)
8098.8
(7289.9)
4345.9
(4280.5)
3.248
(1.120)
2.211
(0.968)
257.9
(166.0)

3.270
(1.209)
1815.0
(779.3)
1.408
(0.516)
8016.5
(7187.9)
4297.1
(4224.8)
3.237
(1.016)
2.207
(0.989)
255.5
(164.3)

3.246
(1.212)
1809.9
(816.4)
1.397
(0.508)
7972.5
(7109.5)
4308.5
(4260.2)
3.249
(1.021)
2.206
(1.084)
256.4
(162.6)

3.259
(1.208)
1819.7
(788.7)
1.406
(0.513)
8056.0
(7233.8)
4331.1
(4269.2)
3.245
(1.055)
2.210
(0.990)
257.0
(165.4)

18347

18346

4587

45866

Notes. Standard deviations are in parentheses. The reported values for the variables lot
size and irrigable area reflect the data following the removal of the largest 0.5% of
observations for each of those variables from the sample, as these variables have extremely
large outliers that differentially skew the means and standard deviations across conditions.
Pretreatment mean water use is measured in gallons per day, and is computed using mean
water use based on reads from December 2013 to November 2014.

34
Table 2
Randomization Checks
Treatments vs. Control

Number of occupants

Home size (sqft.)

Number of floors

Treatments Only

(1)
No Drop

(2)
Drop

(3)
Injunctive Drop

(4)
Drop

(5)
Injunctive Drop

0.0186∗∗∗
(0.00253)

0.0187∗∗∗
(0.00258)

0.0284∗∗∗
(0.00537)

-0.000891
(0.00245)

-0.00286
(0.00247)

-0.0000122
(0.0000126)

-0.00000550
(0.00000615)

-0.00000709
(0.00000622)

-0.0345∗∗∗
(0.0126)

0.00532
(0.00625)

-0.00347
(0.00634)

-0.00000228 -0.00000370
(0.00000625) (0.00000636)
-0.0163∗∗
(0.00634)

-0.0135∗∗
(0.00640)

Lot size (sqft.)

5.49e-08
-0.000000926 -0.000000480 -0.000000337 -0.000000108
(0.000000259) (0.000000873) (0.00000141) (0.000000322) (0.000000262)

Irrigable area

-7.84e-08
0.00000132
(0.000000370) (0.00000125)

0.000000687
0.000000482
0.000000154
(0.00000201) (0.000000459) (0.000000375)

Number of bedrooms

-0.00643∗∗
(0.00327)

-0.00982∗∗∗
(0.00370)

-0.00951
(0.00783)

-0.00189
(0.00333)

0.00275
(0.00328)

Number of bathrooms

0.00148
(0.00491)

0.00375
(0.00458)

0.00892
(0.00892)

0.00347
(0.00464)

0.00443
(0.00474)

-0.0000404∗∗
(0.0000185)

-0.0000640∗
(0.0000367)

-0.0000130
(0.0000182)

-0.00000606
(0.0000185)

0.794∗∗∗
(0.0110)

0.802∗∗∗
(0.0113)

0.512∗∗∗
(0.0224)

0.508∗∗∗
(0.0110)

0.211∗∗∗
(0.0111)

20944
0.003
0.00

20960
0.003
0.00

8400
0.004
0.00

33552
0.000
0.66

20992
0.000
0.72

Pretreatment Mean Water Use -0.0000353∗
(0.0000183)
Constant

Observations
R2
F -test p-value

Notes. Column 1-3 show pairwise balance checks for each treatment condition against the control, and 4-5
show pairwise balance checks for the Drop and Injunctive Drop conditions against the No Drop condition.
Pretreatment mean water use is measured in gallons per day, and is computed using mean water use based
on reads from December 2013 to November 2014. F -tests were used to test for joint significance and
balance. Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
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Table 3
Average Treatment Effects on Water Use
DV: Gallons per Day (GPD)
Excluding Control
(1)
Injunctive Drop

Drop

(2)

(3)

All Conditions
(4)

(6)

-3.519∗∗∗ -2.580∗∗∗ -2.511∗∗∗ -9.694∗∗∗ -8.328∗∗∗ -8.256∗∗∗
(1.043)

(0.923)

(0.914)

-1.438∗∗

-0.777

-0.798

(0.675)

(0.588)

(0.582)

(1.336)

(1.159)

(1.146)

-7.614∗∗∗ -6.510∗∗∗ -6.525∗∗∗
(1.074)

(0.916)

(0.905)

-6.176∗∗∗ -5.737∗∗∗ -5.735∗∗∗

No Drop

(1.073)
Pre-Exp. Cal. Month GPD

Observations

(5)

(0.910)

(0.898)

0.409∗∗∗ 0.413∗∗∗

0.412∗∗∗ 0.414∗∗∗

(0.00527) (0.00549)

(0.00517) (0.00539)

228461

193749

193749

256031

216935

216935

0.000

0.356

0.369

0.000

0.360

0.374

Mean GPD for Omitted Group 198.84

198.84

198.84

205.01

205.01

205.01

Unique Households in Sample

36787

33669

33669

41240

37724

37724

Demographic Controls

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Month-In-Sample Fixed Effects

No

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

Wave Fixed Effects

No

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

0.0462

0.0519

0.0619

0.0462

0.0500

0.0592

R2

Wald Statistic p-value

Notes. This table shows the main results from this experiment, in the form of average treatment effects on water use
(in gallons per day, or GPD), using linear regression models. Specifications 1-3 show the average treatment effects of
the Injunctive Drop and Drop conditions relative to the No Drop condition, and 4-6 show the average treatment
effects of the treatment conditions (Injunctive Drop, Drop, and No Drop) relative to the Control. Regressions with
and without controls are included–the controls are: 1) demographic controls at the household level, which consists of
home size, lot size, irrigable area, and the number of occupants, floors, bedrooms and bathrooms; 2) controls for
pre-treatment mean water usage for a given observation (from water use for the household in the matching calendar
month in the pretreatment period); 3) month-in-sample fixed effects (uniquely identifying each month-year
combination); and 4) wave fixed effects. A p-value for a Wald test is also reported, which relates to the null
hypothesis that the coefficients for the Injunctive Drop and Drop conditions are equal. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
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Table 4
ATEs on the Likelihood of Opening the Next HWR Email
DV: Probability of Opening Next HWR Email
All Treatments

Excluding No Drop

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-0.0177∗

-0.0122

-0.0135

-0.00915

(0.00929)

(0.00933)

(0.00929)

(0.00933)

-0.00422

-0.00315

(0.00586)

(0.00593)

Observations

29673

27518

16538

15368

R2

0.000

0.053

0.000

0.054

Mean Open Rate for Omitted Group

0.657

0.657

0.653

0.653

Demographic Controls

No

Yes

No

Yes

Month-In-Sample Fixed Effects

No

Yes

No

Yes

Wave Fixed Effects

No

Yes

No

Yes

Injunctive Drop

Drop

Notes. This table shows the average treatment effects on the likelihood of opening the next
social norms message following the first HWR email open, using linear regression models.
Specifications 1-2 show the average treatment effects of the Injunctive Drop and Drop
conditions relative to the No Drop condition, and 3-4 show the average treatment effects of
the Injunctive Drop condition relative to the Drop condition. Regressions with and without
controls are shown–the controls are: 1) demographic controls at the household level, which
consists of home size, lot size, irrigable area, and the number of occupants, floors, bedrooms
and bathrooms; 2) month-in-sample fixed effects; and 3) wave fixed effects. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
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Table 5
ATEs on the Percentage of HWR Emails Opened (After the First HWR Email Open)
DV: Percentage of Emails Opened
All Treatments

Excluding No Drop

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-0.00439

-0.00579

-0.00456

-0.00681

(0.00536)

(0.00549)

(0.00536)

(0.00549)

0.000168

0.00104

(0.00343)

(0.00353)

Observations

31279

28959

17430

16166

R2

0.000

0.012

0.000

0.013

Mean Open Rate for Omitted Group

0.490

0.490

0.490

0.490

Demographic Controls

No

Yes

No

Yes

Wave Fixed Effects

No

Yes

No

Yes

Injunctive Drop

Drop

Notes. This table shows the average treatment effects on the percentage of HWR emails
opened following the first HWR email open, using linear regression models. Specifications
1-2 show the average treatment effects of the Injunctive Drop and Drop conditions relative
to the No Drop condition, and 3-4 show the average treatment effects of the Injunctive
Drop condition relative to the Drop condition. Regressions with and without controls are
shown–the controls are: 1) demographic controls at the household level, which consists of
home size, lot size, irrigable area, and the number of occupants, floors, bedrooms and
bathrooms; and 2) wave fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10,
∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01

38

Figure 1 . No Drop, Drop and Injunctive Drop Visuals Provided by WaterSmart

(a) Treatment 1. No Drop

(b) Treatment 2. Drop

(c) Treatment 3.
Drop

Injunctive
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Figure 2 . Other Types of Injunctive Faces Provided by WaterSmart

(a) Frowny Visual

(b) Neutral Visual

(c) Smiley Visual
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Decile 1 Decile 2 Decile 3 Decile 4 Decile 5 Decile 6 Decile 7 Decile 8 Decile 9 Decile 10

Figure 3 . Disaggregated ATEs by Decile of Mean Pre-Treatment Water Use. The error
bars mark ±1 robust standard error. The deciles of pre-treatment mean water usage
were constructed within each of five categorical buckets for the number of occupants in
a given home (1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 or more persons), then aggregated. Decile 1 indicates the
bottom decile (i.e., the lowest pre-experiment household water usage decile in each
occupancy bucket), and Decile 10 indicates the top decile (i.e., the highest
pre-experiment household water usage decile in each occupancy bucket). The
coefficients for deciles 1 and 9 are statistically significant at the 1% level, while the
coefficients for deciles 8 and 10 are statistically significant at the 10% level.
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0.03
0.02
0.01
0
-0.01
-0.02
-0.03
-0.04
-0.05
-0.06
-0.07
Smiley

Neutral

Frowny

Figure 4 . ATEs on the Likelihood of Opening the Next HWR Email, by Injunctive
Norm Type. This figure shows the average treatment effects on the likelihood of
opening the next HWR email following the first HWR email open, disaggregated by the
type of injunctive norm seen on the first HWR email open, using linear regression
models. The average treatment effects of the Injunctive Drop condition relative to the
Drop condition are estimated using specifications with a full set of controls (i.e., that
used in Table 4, column 4). The controls are: 1) demographic controls at the household
level, which consists of home size, lot size, irrigable area, and the number of occupants,
floors, bedrooms and bathrooms; 2) month-in-sample fixed effects; and 3) wave fixed
effects. The error bars mark ±1 robust standard error, and the p-values from
hypotheses tests comparing each coefficient to zero are 0.103, 0.334, and 0.536 for the
smiley, neutral, and frowny messages, respectively.
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0.015

0.01

0.005

0

-0.005

-0.01

-0.015

-0.02

-0.025
Smiley

Neutral

Frowny

Figure 5 . ATEs on the Percentage of HWR Emails Opened (After the First HWR
Email Open), by Injunctive Norm Type. This figure shows the average treatment effects
on the percentage of HWR emails opened following the first HWR email open,
disaggregated by the type of injunctive norm seen on the first HWR email open, using
linear regression models. The average treatment effects of the Injunctive Drop condition
relative to the Drop condition are estimated using specifications with a full set of
controls (i.e., that used in Table 4, column 4). The controls are: 1) demographic
controls at the household level, which consists of home size, lot size, irrigable area, and
the number of occupants, floors, bedrooms and bathrooms; 2) month-in-sample fixed
effects; and 3) wave fixed effects. The error bars mark ±1 robust standard error, and
the p-values from hypotheses tests comparing each coefficient to zero are 0.38, 0.374,
and 0.482 for the smiley, neutral, and frowny messages, respectively.

Online Appendix:
Isolating the Eect of Injunctive Norms on Conservation
Behavior: New Evidence from a Field Experiment in California

Table A.1
The Distribution of the Number of Emails Received by Subjects in Each Treatment Group
Number of emails received
0

1

2

3

4

Total
5

6

7

No Drop Group

346 (1.89%) 288 (1.57%) 319 (1.74%) 378 (2.06%) 546 (2.98%) 1241 (6.76%) 12506 (68.16%) 2723 (14.84%) 18347 (100%)

Drop Group

361 (1.97%) 278 (1.52%) 319 (1.74%) 352 (1.92%) 522 (2.85%) 1256 (6.85%) 12483 (68.04%) 2775 (15.13%) 18346 (100%)

Injunctive Drop Group 87 (1.90%) 72 (1.57%) 81 (1.77%) 94 (2.05%) 134 (2.92%) 279 (6.08%) 3182 (69.37%) 658 (14.34%) 4587 (100%)
Total

794 (1.92%) 638 (1.55%) 719 (1.74%) 824 (2.00%) 1202 (2.91%) 2776 (6.72%) 28171 (68.24%) 6156 (14.91%) 41280 (100%)

Description for Online Appendix Table A.2

As described in the paper, in section 3.5, I performed a large trim of the dataset motivated by the
need to identify appropriate control households for the treatment households, who started receiving
HWRs on dierent dates. Note that this is not strictly necessary for analysis that focuses only on
treated households, which comprises the bulk of the analysis in the paper--it is only inuential for
analysis of treatment eects relative to not receiving emails. The challenge here was to determine
when Control households would have received their rst HWR had they been treated. To do this,
I focused on treatment subjects only and compared the dates of water meter reads in the main
window of HWR email initiation (November 17, 2014 to January 21, 2015) to the dates that these
subjects actually received their rst HWR by email (which ranged for this group from December
9, 2014 to January 30, 2015).

There was a clear pattern, whereby nine distinct ranges of dates

1

for water meter reads were associated with receiving a rst HWR email on a specic, later date.

Using this information, I linked each subject (in all conditions, including the Control) to one of nine
waves based on their meter read dates falling in each of these nine ranges. This eectively grouped
subjects in all conditions into nine distinct subgroups, who received, or would have received in
the case of the Control, their rst HWR email on each of nine specic dates.

Details regarding

these wave assignments and dates are included in Online Appendix Table A.2. I then dropped from
analysis the 706 households that did not have a meter read date in the nine wave windows.

1

For a few meter read dates there was a bit more ambiguity about when rst emails were sent than for others,

and in these cases the most common date of rst email for a given meter read date was used to determine when
Control subjects "would have" received their rst email had they been treated.

Table A.2
Wave Date Range Description
Associated First HWR

Control

Treatment

Email Date

Households

Households

November 17, 2014-November 24, 2014

December 9, 2014

722

6250

November 25, 2014-December 1, 2014

December 12, 2014

406

3513

December 2, 2014-December 5, 2014

December 18, 2014

463

3865

December 6, 2014-December 12, 2014

December 23, 2014

459

3742

December 13, 2014-December 22, 2014

January 2, 2015

683

6318

December 23, 2014-December 24, 2014

January 6, 2015

164

1502

December 26, 2014-December 31, 2014

January 14, 2015

430

3775

January 2, 2015-January 6, 2015 & January 8, 2015-January 13, 2015

January 23, 2015

736

6356

January 7, 2015 & January 14, 2015-January 21, 2015

January 30, 2015

441

4087

Wave Date Range

Table A.3
Average Treatment Effects on Water Use
DV: Gallons per Day (GPD)
Excluding Control
(1)
Injunctive Drop

Drop

(2)

(3)

All Conditions
(4)

(5)

(6)

-3.790∗∗∗ -2.468∗∗ -2.425∗∗ -10.85∗∗∗ -10.52∗∗∗ -10.58∗∗∗
(1.211) (1.121) (1.114) (1.877) (1.942) (1.934)
-1.356 -0.313 -0.333 -8.416∗∗∗ -8.342∗∗∗ -8.455∗∗∗
(0.867) (0.786) (0.783) (1.675) (1.769) (1.759)
-7.060∗∗∗ -8.030∗∗∗ -8.132∗∗∗
(1.722) (1.795) (1.790)

No Drop

Pre-Exp. Cal. Month GPD

0.305∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗
(0.0357) (0.0368)

Observations
247135
2
R
0.000
Mean GPD for Omitted Group 200.11
Unique Households in Sample
40020
Demographic Controls
No
Month-In-Sample Fixed Effects
No
Wave Fixed Effects
No
Wald Statistic p-value
0.0333

209136 209136
0.198
0.207
200.11 200.11
36589 36589
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
0.0487 0.0541

0.316∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗
(0.0338) (0.0349)
274949
0.000
207.17
44511
No
No
No
0.0333

232538
0.185
207.17
40679
Yes
No
No
0.0460

232538
0.193
207.17
40679
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.0509

Notes. This table shows analyses that precisely mirror those in Table 3 in the main paper, but without any of the
data restrictions used (as described in Section 3.5 in the paper). Note that households without post-treatment
data are still excluded here, since they did not have any outcome data to be analyzed. The results are
qualitatively similar to those in Table 3 in the main paper. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10,
∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01

